MASSACRE OR MYTH? BANASTRE TARLETON AT THE WAXHAWS,
MAY 29, 1780

Welcome to our second newsletter, “The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution”, dedicated to the study of the War for American Independence in the Southern Department from 1760 to 1789. We want to encourage the exchange of information on the Southern Campaigns’ battle sites, their location, preservation, historic signage and interpretation, artifacts and archaeology, as well as the personalities, military tactics, units, logistics, strategy and the political leadership of the region. We will highlight professionals and amateurs actively engaged in Revolutionary War research, preservation and interpretation to encourage a dynamic exchange of information. All are invited to submit articles, pictures, documents, events, and suggestions. We will feature battles and skirmishes, documents, maps, artifacts, Internet links, and people involved in research.

Charles B. Baxley, editor
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Next Issue: Col. James Williams of the South Carolina Militia and Visit Laurens County, SC Revolutionary War sites.

Editor’s Notes

Last month we looked at primary source writings on the Battle of Rocky Mount. In the summer of 1780 after the fall of Charleston, the South Carolina backcountry militia had been mobilized opposing the organization of Loyalist militias, the administration of Crown loyalty oaths, and loyalist patrols at Beaufort, South Carolina and South Carolina backcountry militia action in South Carolina after the fall of litoral Savannah, Beaufort, and Charleston. The British quickly extended their dominance 100 miles inland extending an arc of forward bases from Augusta, Ninety Six, Camden, to Georgetown. The attack on the British forward position at Rocky Mount followed the North Carolina Patriot victory dispersing the Loyalist gathered at Ramsey’s Mills on June 20, 1780 (at modern Lincolnoln, NC). After the Patriot’s failure to dislodge the Loyalist at Rocky Mount, the backcountry militia cooperation, in opposition to restoration of Crown rule, was in action only a week later at the second Battle of Hanging Rock, (near modern Heath Springs, South Carolina), and this time with great success. Gen. Thomas Sumter proved himself an effective partisan militia leader and renewed the pattern of inter-state militia cooperation while the South Carolina rebel government was in exile.

In this newsletter we slightly regress in time and study modern research on the Battle of the Waxhaws, better known from the American point of view as Buford’s Massacre. On May 29, 1780, this defeat of the last organized Continental Army in the Southern Department was skillfully turned into a great propaganda victory for the Patriot cause, equal to a Texan’s battle cry, “Remember the Alamo” or the Spanish–American War’s “Remember the Maine”. Jim Piecuch, history professor at Clarion University, shares his article on this battle and examines the question of whether or not there was really a “massacre” at the Waxhaws. Villainizing the victorious British Commander, Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton became a favorite tactic of 18th century Patriots and subsequent American historians. Interestingly, Tarleton returned to England a celebrity and war hero. Mel Gibson and Hollywood picked up some of the Tarleton myth and reputation in his hit movie, “The Patriot”. As now in the Middle East, at some point I am sure Lord Cornwallis wondered if he was creating more Rebels than he was subjugating.

The initial focus of the newsletter has been on the Revolution in South Carolina. This is for two reasons. First, more battles and skirmishes were fought in South Carolina than in her sister states and most practically, my files are heavily biased on local materials. This narrow focus is already being overcome by article submissions on topics from all over the Department; the other important areas will get their due.

I plan to be in Savannah on October 8-9-10, 2004 enjoying the fall weather for the 225th anniversary of the bloodiest hour of the Revolution where the Patriot and French allied attack on October 9, 1779 on the Spring Hill Redoubt failed. If you are there, be sure to see Monticello – Home of Founding to Continental Cavalry Commander Gen. Casimir Pulaski, the Gen. Nathanael Greene obelisk in Johnson Square and a beautiful statute of Sgt. William Jasper, hero of the Battle of Fort Sullivan in Madison Square. Scott Smith, Executive Director of Savannah’s Coastal Heritage Society is the luckiest man; not only is he a great Southern Campaign scholar, in his job he has his own fort (Fort Jackson), his own steam locomotives and roundhouse, an important Revolutionary War battlefield (the Spring Hill Redoubt), and some great cannon. Scott gives a passionate description of the French and Americans forlorn hope attack on the Spring Hill Redoubt. The Savannah Campaigns are fascinating. David Reuwer and I led a tour there earlier this year and had a great time visiting the ground where the British recaptured Savannah from the rebel government and held it against a vastly superior allied siege. The campaigns against the British stronghold in East Florida started from Savannah; one ill fated campaign led to the fatal dual between a Georgia signer of the Declaration of Independence, Button Gwinnett, and Gen. Lachlan McIntosh. Thank you for all of your kind letters and emails. This is not Charles Bailey’s newsletter; it is a shared open forum for all fellow cohorts – rebel or loyalist partisans alike. Your input, criticism, contribution, and support are appreciated.

We want this newsletter to be an exchange of information between all interested in the Southern Campaigns: from professional scholars, the relic hunters, living history re-enactors, and avid amateurs. Scholars, archaeologists, and avid amateurs especially need a constructive link with the “diggers”. I have observed the excellent working relationship between professional archaeologists and Indian relic collectors at Archaeological Field Days that we need to emulate. Many metal detector hobbyists have done excellent archival research and have done the field work to locate and interpret many of these battles. Unfortunately, their knowledge and finds are not often preserved and shared so it is imperative that we talk together. We need to put these important actions on the actual ground. Some have argued that publication of Revolutionary War battlefields’ locations will encourage “looters” and “pot-hunters”. I have found that many of those (but not all) who have done the research in the libraries and on the ground are sensitive to landowners’ rights, respect those who fought, and already quite well know exactly where the actions were. Have collectors ever trespassed, left “pot” holes and taken valuable relics? I am sure, but so have credentialed archaeologists left holes, taken relics, not published their findings, and locked their finds away from the public and others’ view in dusty university vaults. Most of the 18th century metallic artifacts are quickly degenerating and, if now not quickly found, they will disintegrate and be lost forever. Unfortunately, there are too few professional archaeologists and too little money to do the needed surveys, so a joint venture is imperative. To appropriately understand these actions, interpret and preserve the finds, to preserve those special places where men fought and died, and to interpret them for others, requires this sharing.

Next month we will explore the interesting and controversial career of South Carolina Patriot militia Colonel James
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Current Research on the Battle of the Waxhaws, commonly called “Buford’s Massacre”

On May 6, 1780 at Lenud’s (Lanneau’s) Ferry over the Santee River, Patriot Col. Abraham Buford and 350 Virginia Continentals watched helplessly from the Northeast bank of the Santee River while Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton dispered a force of Continentals including Continental cavalry commanded by Lt. Col. Anthony White. Col. Buford had been dispatched to Charleston as reinforcements and replacements of the Virginia Continental Line. Lenud’s Ferry was located near the modern US 17A/SC 41 highway bridge over the Santee River.

On May 12, the British siege of Charleston ended when Patriot Southern Department commandant, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln, surrendered his army and the City of Charleston to British Lt. Gen. Henry Clinton. When word of the surrender reached Col. Buford, he held his position and awaited new orders. Gen. Isaac Huger, who had been defeated by Lt. Col. Tarleton and Maj. Patrick Ferguson at the Battle of Monck’s Corner on April 14, ordered Buford to retreat to Hillsborough, North Carolina.

On May 18, 1780, Lt. Gen. Charles Cornwallis commanding 2,500 British Regulars and Provincials marched from the Charleston area with orders from Gen. Clinton to subdue the South Carolina backcountry and establish defensive outposts and forward supply posts. Gen. Cornwallis moved to Lenud’s Ferry where he crossed the Santee River and marched up the north bank of the Santee towards Camden, SC. Along the way, Cornwallis learned that South Carolina’s rebel Governor, John Rutledge, and two councilors had used the same route under the escort of Col. Buford. Gov. Rutledge managed to flee Charleston during the last stages of the siege. Col. Buford’s party was ten days ahead. In a bold move to capture Gov. Rutledge and crush the last Continentals in the South, Gen. Cornwallis detached Lt. Col. Tarleton in pursuit. On May 27, Tarleton’s corps rode from Nelson’s Ferry over the Santee with 270 men. Tarleton’s command included forty British regulars of the 17th Dragoons, 130 of his British Legion provincial cavalry, 100 of the British Legion infantry, mounted on this occasion, and one three-pound artillery piece.

Tarleton’s force covered 60 miles and was in Camden the next day. At 2:00 a.m. on May 29, Tarleton set out again and reached Tory Col. Henry Rugeley’s home, Clermont, on the Great Waxhaw Road at Grannies Quarter Creek 13 miles north of Camden by mid-morning. There, he learned that Gov. Rutledge had been there the night before and Col. Buford’s Continentals were now only 20 miles ahead.

Tarleton sent a fast rider ahead summoning Col. Buford’s surrender. Buford declined and the ensuing brief decisive battle had far reaching effects on the war in the Southern Department. Just as Col. Travis’ men defending the Alamo would electrify the defenders of Texas in 1836, the cry “Tarleton’s Quarter” from the survivors of Buford’s Massacre became an important factor in polarizing backcountry settlers in Georgia and the Carolinas against the Crown. The Battle of the Waxhaws from a tactical prospective is an interesting use of cavalry as shock troops, but its strategic import in the propaganda of the times makes it a major action.

This compilation of research materials grows out of my interest in Southern Campaigns of the American Revolutionary War. Hosting the 2002 symposium on the fascinating young British cavalry commander, Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton and his provincial corps, the British Legion, led me to modern Tarleton scholars: Dr. Tony Scotti, Dr. Jim Piecuch, Tracy Power, and Tom Rider; Revolutionary War historians John Maass and Patrick O’Kelley; and active amateur historians Todd W. Braisted, Marg Baskin and Janie Cheaney, upon whose works I have relied and to whom I am indebted. Also my interest in preservation of the Battle of Camden battlefield lead me to work with D. Lindsey Pettus, former chairman of the Lancaster County (SC) Council and President of the active Katawba Valley Land Trust who has a longstanding interest in Buford’s Battleground. Additionally, I am very indebted to amateur historians Calvin Keys and Merle “Mac” McGee who have shared their work with me and my energetic friends and fellow travelers, John A. Robertson and David P. Reuer, Esq.

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MASSACRE OR MYTH? BANASTRE TARLETON AT THE WAXHAWS, MAY 29, 1780

by James Piecuch

The American Revolution has given the United States a pantheon of national heroes, and two enduring villains: Benedict Arnold and Banastre Tarleton. Arnold's infamy derives from his defection to the British after failing in an attempt to betray the post at West Point, New York. Tarleton's ignominy arises from his troops' alleged massacre of American troops who were attempting to surrender at the Waxhaws, South Carolina, on May 29, 1780. The events that day at the Waxhaws produced the slogan "Tarleton's Quarter," meaning to give no quarter to prisoners, and led to retaliatory acts that greatly increased the violence of the Revolutionary struggle in the Southern colonies.

But what really happened that May afternoon at the Waxhaws? Did the British Legion of loyalists and regular British troops of the 17th Light Dragoons wantonly butcher, under the eyes of wounded and surgeons were sent for, only minutes was followed by a massacre that lasted longer. The British Legion, Americans all, began butchering their vanquished countrymen. A 1992 article on the "Buford's Massacre" expresses similar views. Tarleton's biographers have taken the same position. Robert D. Bass, unequivocally pronounces the Waxhaws battle a massacre, and makes no attempt to defend his subject from American charges of brutality. In a recent work, Anthony J. Scotti, Jr. offers a more nuanced description of the affair, stating that "how one views this engagement depends upon which side of the political fence one is sitting." Scotti, however, writes that "tragic misunderstanding and anger permitted a frenzy of bloodletting to feed upon itself." While not specifically dealing with the Waxhaws incident, "The Patriot," a film released in 2000, featured the character of Colonel William Tavington, who is described as being "suggested by Colonel Banastre Tarleton, a British officer nicknamed 'Bloody Ban the Butcher,'" for his policy of killing surrendering troops." In the film, Tavington orders his troops to kill a group of wounded American prisoners, and also burns a church full of civilians. Therefore, those exposed to the story of the Revolution in the Carolinas, either by reading recent histories or watching a popular movie, are left with no doubts as to Tarleton's brutality or the veracity of his massacre of Americans at the Waxhaws.

Only a few historians have questioned the validity of the charges regarding the Waxhaws Massacre, and then only in passing. Describing the battle, Don Higginbotham notes that "details of the slaughter - at what point did Buford offer a white flag, and did Tarleton try to retrain the Legion from senseless killings - are hopelessly confused," but went on to declare that Tarleton, though he "may not have been a butcher, was ruthless by the standards of warfare in his day," which in the end condemns Tarleton more than it exonerates him. John Pancake is a more lenient judge, stating that the battle with Buford gave Tarleton "a notoriety that he may not have altogether deserved." In addition, he notes that "[r]eports that Tarleton's men bayonetted the wounded are hardly consistent with the fact that the British paroled the wounded and 'surgeons were sent for from Camden and Charlotte town to assist them.'" But that is the limit of historians' defense of Tarleton, and such statements are only minutes was followed by a massacre that lasted longer. The British Legion, Americans all, began butchering their vanquished countrymen. A 1992 article on the "Buford's Massacre" expresses similar views. Tarleton's biographers have taken the same position. Robert D. Bass, unequivocally pronounces the Waxhaws battle a massacre, and makes no attempt to defend his subject from American charges of brutality. In a recent work, Anthony J. Scotti, Jr. offers a more nuanced description of the affair, stating that "how one views this engagement depends upon which side of the political fence one is sitting." Scotti, however, writes that "tragic misunderstanding and anger permitted a frenzy of bloodletting to feed upon itself." While not specifically dealing with the Waxhaws incident, "The Patriot," a film released in 2000, featured the character of Colonel William Tavington, who is described as being "suggested by Colonel Banastre Tarleton, a British officer nicknamed 'Bloody Ban the Butcher,'" for his policy of killing surrendering troops." In the film, Tavington orders his troops to kill a group of wounded American prisoners, and also burns a church full of civilians. Therefore, those exposed to the story of the Revolution in the Carolinas, either by reading recent histories or watching a popular movie, are left with no doubts as to Tarleton's brutality or the veracity of his massacre of Americans at the Waxhaws.

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10. John S. Pancake, This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782, University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1985, p. 71
overwhelmed by the quantity of works that report the Waxhaws Massacre as indisputable fact.

In denouncing Tarleton’s cruelty, the majority of recent historians are simply following in the path created by earlier writers who chronicled the Revolution in the South. Writing a century ago, Edward McCrady denounced the “inhuman butchery” that followed Buford’s refusal to surrender his force, and went on to lament the “scene of indiscriminate carnage never surpassed by the ruthless atrocities of the most barbarous savages.” A similar tale was told by David Ramsay in 1858, who described the event as follows:

The Americans, finding resistance useless, sued for quarters, but their submission produced no cessation of hostilities. Some of them, after they had ceased to resist, lost their hands, others their arms, and almost every one was mangled with a succession of wounds.

Ramsay concludes his account by observing that the “barbarous massacre” gave rise to a “spirit of revenge” that made itself felt throughout the rest of the war. Both Joseph Johnson and Alexander Garden express similar opinions; the latter states that despite his responsibility for it, David Ramsay in 1858, who described the event as follows:

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who refused Tarleton's surrender demand before the battle began, as Lee's son and editor, Robert E. Lee, was careful to note in preparing a new edition of the memoirs for publication after the Civil War. Henry Lee had reported a mistaken version of events, one that was current at the time he wrote, and that his memoir promulgated for six decades. Doubtless many others, like Lee, had heard this version, and thus through both the printed and spoken word the massacre story survived and thrived through error.

If Americans of the Revolutionary era who were familiar with the facts did not believe that a massacre took place at the Waxhaws, then how, in addition to the error that deceived Lee, did the story gain credence? In actuality, firsthand accounts of the event are scarce, and their validity must be carefully evaluated if any attempt to ascertain what truly happened that day is to be known.

The general outline of the story is clear. Abraham Buford and his detachment of 350 Virginia Continental troops had reached Lenud's Ferry, South Carolina, in a forlorn attempt to relieve the siege of Charleston when they learned of the city's surrender on May 12, 1780. General Isaac Huger then ordered Buford to retreat to North Carolina to join reinforcements heading south from George Washington's army. During much of his march, Buford's force, which had been joined by a detachment of cavalry, was accompanied by Governor Rutledge and some members of his council who had escaped from Charleston before the British ring had closed upon the city. British General Lord Charles Cornwallis, hoping to defeat this last Continental force in the state and to capture Rutledge, dispatched Tarleton on May 22 to strike Buford if possible. Because Buford's force had a ten day head start and "the practicality of the design appeared so doubtful," Cornwallis's orders were discretionary, and allowed Tarleton to discontinue the pursuit if he saw fit, or to attack as opportunity presented. Tarleton's force consisted of 40 regulars of the 17th Light Dragoons, 130 cavalry of the British Legion, and another 100 Legion infantrymen mounted for the pursuit, a total of 270 men. After separating from the main army on May 27 and making a remarkable journey of 105 miles in 54 hours through rough country, Tarleton caught up with Buford on May 29. What happened afterwards has never been adequately explained.

At 6 a.m. on May 28 Joseph Kershaw and a deputation representing the inhabitants of Camden, which town Buford had left the previous day, after parting company with Rutledge and his party, went south with a petition to present to the British asking for protection. Four hours later they encountered Tarleton and his troops heading towards the town. Kershaw presented the petition, in response to which Tarleton "assured us it was his Order & Earl Cornwallis particular desire that Our Property Should remain untouched except for supplies the army urgently required, and that their intention was only to put the Country into a State of Peace & tranquility." Tarleton reached the town at 1 p.m. Clearly, Tarleton was not then seeking blood to appease his resentments; even in the midst of a vigorous pursuit he was both civil and conciliatory.

While at Camden, Tarleton learned of Buford's approximate position and that the Americans were attempting to join a force of North Carolina militia that was moving toward Charlotte. Despite his determination to strike Buford before he could reach these reinforcements, Tarleton ordered a brief rest. His corps had lost several horses from the heat and the speed of their march that day, and replaced them by impressing others along their route. At 2 a.m. on May 29 he resumed his march. In an effort to delay Buford, or bluff him into surrender by exaggerating the strength of his own force and the proximity of Cornwallis's army, Tarleton sent an officer ahead with a surrender demand.

Sir,

Resistance being vain, to prevent the effusion of human blood, I make offers which can never be repeated: -- You are now almost encompassed by a corps of seven hundred light troops on horseback; half of that number are infantry with cannon, the rest cavalry: Earl Cornwallis is likewise within a short march with nine British battalions.

I warn you of the temerity of farther inimical proceedings, and I hold out the following conditions, which are nearly the same as were accepted by Charles town: But if any persons attempt to fly after this flag is received, rest assured, that their rank shall not protect them, if taken, from rigorous treatment.

1st ART. All officers to be prisoners of war, but admitted to parole, and allowed to return to their habitations till exchanged.

2d ART. All continental soldiers to go to Lampie's point, or any neighbouring post, to remain there till exchanged, and to receive the same provisions as British soldiers.

3d ART. All militia soldiers to be prisoners upon parole at their respective habitations.

4th ART. All arms, artillery, ammunition, stores, provisions, wagons, horses, &c. to be faithfully delivered.

5th ART. All officers to be allowed their private baggage and horses, and to have their side arms returned.

I expect an answer to these propositions as soon as possible; if they are accepted, you will order every person under your command to pile his arms in one hour after you receive the flag: If you are rash enough to reject them, the blood be upon your hand.

I have the honour to be, (Signed) BAN. TARLETON, Lieutenant colonel, commandant of the British legion.

Colonel Buford, &c. &c.


The message put Tarleton's numbers at 700 mounted light troops, half infantry and half cavalry, along with artillery. After a warning that anyone who attempted to leave the American detachment after receipt of the truce flag would "experience hostile treatment," the rather liberal terms were enumerated. All officers would be paroled and allowed to return home, and Continental
enlisted men would join their counterparts captured at Charleston and imprisoned in and near the city. Any militia troops with Buford would be paroled to their homes, and both Continental and militia officers could keep their horses, sidearms, and private baggage. All other supplies and equipment would be surrendered to the British. Tarleton gave Buford a half hour to reply, and instructed him that if the terms were accepted, his men should pile their arms in one hour. If Buford refused the surrender demand, Tarleton warned, "the Blood be upon Your head." 24

The flag reached Buford at 1 p.m. He did not halt to consider the terms, as Tarleton had hoped, but continued his march. Buford verbally refused the surrender demand without hesitation, and then gathered his officers to inform them of what had occurred. They unanimously supported their commander. 25

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Wacsaws, May 29, 1780.

Sir,
I reject your proposals, and shall defend myself to the last extremity.
I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) ABR. BUFORD, Colonel.

Lieut. Col. Tarleton,
Commanding British legion


Buford's refusal to give serious thought to the surrender demand, or to consult his officers before refusing, were a serious error. By his own account the roads were difficult to travel due to heavy rains, and his horses were so "greatly reduced by long marches" that he had already been forced to leave behind a wagon loaded with gunpowder earlier in the day. To these disadvantages Buford could have added that his troops were exhausted after marching from Virginia to the vicinity of Charleston and then back almost to the North Carolina border, and undoubtedly demoralized from the endless marches and the crushing defeat their fellow enlisted men would join their counterparts captured at Charleston and imprisoned in and near the city. Any militia troops with Buford would be paroled to their homes, and both Continental and militia officers could keep their horses, sidearms, and private baggage. All other supplies and equipment would be surrendered to the British. Tarleton gave Buford a half hour to reply, and instructed him that if the terms were accepted, his men should pile their arms in one hour. If Buford refused the surrender demand, Tarleton warned, "the Blood be upon Your head." 24

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24 Tarleton to Buford, May 29, 1780, Thomas Addis Emmet Collection, New York Public Library
25 Abraham Buford to Virginia Assembly, June 2, 1780, Emmet Collection
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Buford's refusal to give serious thought to the surrender demand, or to consult his officers before refusing, were a serious error. By his own account the roads were difficult to travel due to heavy rains, and his horses were so "greatly reduced by long marches" that he had already been forced to leave behind a wagon loaded with gunpowder earlier in the day. To these disadvantages Buford could have added that his troops were exhausted after marching from Virginia to the vicinity of Charleston and then back almost to the North Carolina border, and undoubtedly demoralized from the endless marches and the crushing defeat their fellow enlisted men would join their counterparts captured at Charleston and imprisoned in and near the city. Any militia troops with Buford would be paroled to their homes, and both Continental and militia officers could keep their horses, sidearms, and private baggage. All other supplies and equipment would be surrendered to the British. Tarleton gave Buford a half hour to reply, and instructed him that if the terms were accepted, his men should pile their arms in one hour. If Buford refused the surrender demand, Tarleton warned, "the Blood be upon Your head." 24

The flag reached Buford at 1 p.m. He did not halt to consider the terms, as Tarleton had hoped, but continued his march. Buford verbally refused the surrender demand without hesitation, and then gathered his officers to inform them of what had occurred. They unanimously supported their commander. 25

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24 Tarleton to Buford, May 29, 1780, Thomas Addis Emmet Collection, New York Public Library
25 Abraham Buford to Virginia Assembly, June 2, 1780, Emmet Collection
26 Ibid.

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24 Tarleton to Buford, May 29, 1780, Thomas Addis Emmet Collection, New York Public Library
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percent of his men had kept up with him, Tarleton could not have deployed more than 240 troops against Buford's 350 infantry.

It was now about 3:30 in the afternoon. With his usual impetuosity, Tarleton ordered a charge as soon as his men had formed. Although Buford's order not to fire was a welcome surprise to Tarleton and allowed his cavalry to reach the American line with little loss and its formation intact, Buford reported that his "men and officers behav'd with the greatest coolness & Bravery," and that after Cochrane's men broke his left flank, the troops were able to rally and reform fifty yards to the rear.  

It was at this point that the battle became so chaotic that extensive sifting of the evidence is required to determine what happened. Buford claimed that after the troops on his left had reformed, he realized that he was completely surrounded, heavily outnumbered, and that the time had come to surrender. Accordingly he dispatched an officer to Tarleton with a flag of truce.

The fate and even the identity of the flag bearer are difficult to determine. Henry Bowyer, Buford's adjutant, claimed to have been ordered by Buford to carry a flag to Tarleton, and that he had protested, as it would require him to "pass between the two armies, then hotly engaged, and thus be exposed to the fire of both." When Buford repeated the order, Bowyer said he rode forward toward Tarleton, who he could see observing the battle with a group of officers. Just before Bowyer reached the group, Tarleton's horse was shot and fell, pinning the British commander's leg beneath it. Enraged by this, Tarleton saw Bowyer and shouted, "cut the d-----d rebel down." But a timely American volley threw the horses of Tarleton's party into confusion, and though wounded, Bowyer made his escape by leaping a fence with his horse.

Bowyer's account is so contrary to the other evidence as to be almost worthless. He could not have hesitated to pass between lines of firing troops, since there was no exchange of volleys. Most of the Continentals had no opportunity to fire more than once before the cavalry was upon them, while Cochrane reported that his infantry charged with the bayonet, never firing a shot. Since Tarleton himself participated in the attack, during which his horse was indeed shot down, he could not have been watching with a group of officers. Finally, Buford stated that his offer of surrender was "refused in a very rude manner," but Bowyer said he never had the opportunity to relay the offer, let alone return to Buford with an answer. His account, apparently recorded long after the event, was evidently influenced by the passage of time and his desire to tell his listeners what they wanted to hear.

Although Buford clearly indicated that he dispatched only one flag of truce, a second person claimed to have carried it. Robert Brownfield, a surgeon's mate in the Second South Carolina Continentals, writing some forty years after the event, stated that an Ensign Cruit had carried the flag, but when he tried to advance with it, "was instantly cut down." Cruit, however, survived the battle.

Again, Brownfield's account is not consistent with Buford's report or other known facts of the battle. Buford stated that the flag was refused with a rude reply; Brownfield says it never reached the British lines. Brownfield also states that upon receiving Tarleton's surrender demand Buford called a council of officers to deliberate upon three options the commander proposed; Buford states that he consulted his officers only after refusing the demand for surrender. Brownfield claims that Tarleton's attack followed soon after Buford's refusal to surrender, and that the British deployed their infantry in the center and the cavalry on their flanks. Buford reports a space of two and a half hours between the summons and the attack, and he and Tarleton agreed that the latter's deployment interspersed infantry and cavalry. Brownfield's evidence, once tested, is of no more value than that of Bowyer.

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Wacsaw May 30th 1780

My Lord,

I have the honor to inform you that Yesterday at 3 o'clock PM, after a March of 105 Miles in 54 Hours, with the Corps of Cavalry, the Infantry of the Legion mounted on Horses and a 3 Pounder, at Wacsaw, near the Line which divides North from South Carolina, the Rebel Force commanded by Colonel Buford, consisting of the 11th Virginia, and Detachments of other Regiments, from the same Province, with Artillery & some Cavalry were brought to Action.

After the Summons in which Terms similar to those accepted by Charlestown were offered and positively rejected; the Action commenced in a Wood.

The Attacks were pointed at both Flanks, the Front and Reserve, by 270 Cavalry & Infantry blended, and at the same instant all were equally victorious; few of the Enemy escaping except the Commanding Officer by a precipitate Flight on Horseback.

It is above my Ability to say anything in Commendation of the bravery & Exertion of Officers and Men.

I leave their Merit to your Lordships Consideration.

I have the Honor &c
(Signed) Ban: TARLETON
Lt. Coll. Comg. B Legion

Lt. General
Earl CORNWALLIS

From United Kingdom, Public Record Office, Headquarters Papers of the British Army in America, PRO 30/55/2784.

In the end, there is no reliable information as to the identity of the flag bearer. But his fate was obviously different from that of any other bearers, Bowyer and Cruit, for he returned to Buford to report a rude refusal. Neither Tarleton nor Cochrane mention seeing a truce flag sent forward, and while they might have neglected this in order to defend their actions, it is certainly possible that they did not see the flag. Cochrane was busy directing his attack on the American left flank, where resistance was strongest, while Tarleton was pinned beneath his horse at the beginning of the action and, needing time to extricate himself and then find another animal to mount, could easily have failed to see the flag. Reasonable inference can fill in the gap: since a commanding officer generally took position at the center and to the rear of his force, Buford's flag bearer would most likely have headed there, where he would have encountered neither Tarleton nor Cochrane, but instead either Captain Corbet or Captain Kinlock of the Legion. Neither of these officers would have had the authority to...
accept the flag in the midst of battle; Buford admits that his troops continued to fire while the flag advanced. If the Legion officers, who would have had little time for civilities, brusquely told the flag bearer to find Tarleton and address him, the man could easily, in the noise and confusion, have understood this to be a refusal to receive the flag, and returned and reported the same to Buford. This explanation accounts for the variance in Buford's, Tarleton's, and Cochrane's reports, without having to rely on the error-riddled statements of Bowyer and Brownfield.

With Buford believing his surrender offer spurned, Tarleton unaware that such an offer had been made, the Continentals still resisting and the dragoons charging back and forth through the lines, the American commander panicked. He claimed to have been surrounded, which he was not, since he was able to effect his escape in a manner which anticipated Horatio Gates' flight from Camden the following August, racing away and leaving his men behind. He also claimed that Tarleton's force was four times the size of his own, when it was considerably smaller than the American unit. He further insisted that about the time he made his escape, many of his men "were killed after they had lain down their arms." 38

Considering the other inaccuracies in this portion of Buford's statement, this last claim is open to question. Did he have time to witness this before or during his flight? Did he believe that men who had thrown away their muskets and were fleeing in every direction with the dragoons at their heels to have "lain down their arms"? Did it appear to him that men with their hands raised above their heads to ward off saber blows were in the act of surrendering? Buford's testimony is the best evidence from the American side for the murder of men attempting to surrender, and it is not beyond challenge. The dubious account of Brownfield also alleges the murder of prisoners; he reports that an officer of the rear guard was sabered as he lay wounded on the ground, but Tarleton states that there was no officer with the rear guard, although he may have mistaken the officer for a sergeant. But since the rear guard was captured before the battle began and apparently without serious resistance, it is unlikely that any of those men would have been lying wounded on the ground at the time, or that their captors, in a hurry to form, would have taken the time to assault a wounded soldier lying near them. Brownfield cites only one specific incident of wounds inflicted after the battle ended, the case of Captain John Stokes, who had been badly cut up in resisting a pair of dragoons. Lying on the ground afterwards, a passing infantryman asked him if he wanted quarter, but Stokes refused the offer and instead demanded, "finish me as soon as possible." The British soldier bayoneted Stokes twice in response, but he survived and repeated the request to another soldier, with the same result. 39 But Stokes' experience, if true, was not a murderous attack, but a failed attempt to end his misery at his own request, after he had refused quarter.

The only reliable corroboration for Buford's claim that some surrendering Americans were killed comes from Tarleton himself. He attributed some American casualties to "a vindictive asperity not easily restrained" that his troops displayed when, seeing his horse fall, they believed their commander had been killed. 40

Was there, then, a Waxhaws massacre? Certainly not in the sense that prisoners were systematically killed after having surrendered. There was a confused, brief battle, in which the American line was quickly broken. Organization disappeared, and as some Americans fled and others attempted to resist, with British dragoons charging back and forth, a flag of truce miscarried. The result, due in part to the Americans' holding their fire until the cavalry was upon them, was a disproportionate amount of American casualties, though not unusual for such actions, as Moultrie noted, nor for other engagements of the Revolution in which one side gained a quick advantage over the opponent. In this confusion, with officers unable to exert control, some Legion troops in all likelihood killed Americans who attempted to surrender in revenge for the presumed death of their commanding officer, though this must have been limited to the left of the British line, where Tarleton fell. Other British troops, in the confusion, did not bother to make a distinction between men who were attempting to surrender while their fellow soldiers next to them continued to resist. And some fleeing Americans were undoubtedly run down by the British cavalry and killed or wounded.

But none of this constitutes a deliberate massacre, and Tarleton cannot be held responsible, since his admission of his men's vindictive behavior implies an effort to restrain it. The number of Americans killed or injured while trying to surrender could not have been large, since Cochrane kept his troops under control throughout the action, and they constituted nearly half of the British force, and no cruelties can be directly attributed to the troops in the center of the line. The deaths and injuries of the several unfortunate victims on the American right were unnecessary and worthy of criticism, but they did not constitute anything like the systematic butchery of legend.

Why, then, did the massacre legend gain such currency, despite the reluctance of many Americans then and later to give it credit? The answer is that it served two purposes. First, in a desperate situation for the Americans, who were faced with the actual loss of the two southernmost states and the impending conquest of North Carolina, and with thousands of former rebels rushing to take British protection, it provided a cautionary tale of British ruthlessness and perfidy that could keep the wavering in the Revolutionary ranks, and a rallying cry to encourage others to continue resistance. This was the case with South Carolinian Joseph Gaston and his friends, who on hearing of "the shocking massacre of Colonel Bradford's [Buford's] men, by Tarleton," all swore to fight on and never surrender.

As the struggle in the South dragged on and descended into a bitter civil war marked by cruelties that horrified everyone from Cornwallis to Nathanael Greene, the myth of the Waxhaws Massacre became a defense for Americans who carried out similar acts, and did so more frequently and on a larger scale than anything that took place at the Waxhaws. For Americans who based their desire for independence from Britain in large part on their claims to superior virtue, and who, like the Reverend William Tennent, calculated their strength not in arms but by their "Degrees of Holiness," 41 and now found themselves engaging in the very acts of violence they claimed to abhor in Tarleton, the insistence that they were only exacting vengeance for earlier transgressions committed against themselves was a necessary justification.

For William R. Davie, who admitted killing prisoners at Rocky Mount, South Carolina, because they were captured "under the eye of the whole British camp" and he might not have been able to carry them off; for William Washington, who at Hammond's Store, South Carolina, killed 160 loyalists and took only 35 prisoners, his men having "in remembrance Some of Mr. Tarltons former Acts and Perfidy that could keep the waverers in the Revolutionary ranks, and a rallying cry to encourage others to continue resistance. This was the case with South Carolinian Joseph Gaston and his friends, who on hearing of "the shocking massacre of Colonel Bradford's [Buford's] men, by Tarleton," all swore to fight on and never surrender."


38 Buford to Virginia Assembly
39 Tarleton, p. 29; Brownfield, pp. 3-5
40 Tarleton, p. 31
themselves as well as for later generations, that they were still virtuous citizens defending a "glorious cause."43

It is remarkable that despite these incidents, which are better-documented and on a greater scale than the alleged cruelties committed at the Waxhaws, the reputations of Lee, William Washington, Davie, and the over-mountain men have suffered little or not at all. The same historians who denounce Tarleton's slaughter of Buford's troops overlook similar cruelties committed by American units, or provide extenuating circumstances, often going to great lengths to do so.

After more than 220 years, it is time for historians to apply the same standards equally to both sides in the American Revolution. Interpretations of the Revolution have for too long been made through the distorting lens of the "glorious cause," in which all the American patriots are heroes and the British and loyalists, scoundrels. Judging Banastre Tarleton, Henry Lee, William Washington, and William R. Davie by the same standard does not make the latter three villains, but it does place Tarleton and his Legion in the context of dedicated leaders, committed to their cause, who at some point, in the excitement and confusion of battle, either deliberately or inadvertently took actions, or failed to prevent actions of their troops, that resulted in unnecessary cruelty towards their enemy. In the case of Tarleton at the Waxhaws, there is not a shred of evidence that he condoned or ordered any such behavior, and what evidence does exist of his troops' killing men who tried to surrender indicates that it occurred on a small scale, both in absolute numbers and relative to similar incidents perpetrated by American troops in later engagements. It is time to look beyond the Revolutionary myth, to judge the events of that era with fairness, and thus to explode the myth of the Waxhaws "Massacre." Such an objective analysis has been delayed for too long, and is overdue for historians, who have been prone to accept the dubious evidence of Brownfield, Bowyer, and others at face value. But it comes too late for the many hundreds of British soldiers and American loyalists, who in attempting to surrender, or after having been taken prisoner, died needlessly at the hands of American patriots shouting "Tarleton's Quarter."


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43 Robinson, Sketches of Davie, 12; John Davidson to Mordecai Gist, Jan. 10, 1781, Mordecai Gist Papers, Maryland Historical Society; Diary of Anthony Allaire, New Brunswick Museum, St. John, NS

Appendix 1

1. Great Wagon Road to Salisbury, NC.

2. Col. Buford’s artillery and baggage train.

3. Road to Charlotte, NC.


6. Camden, SC. May 27th NC militia under B. Gen. William Caswell with 600 NC militiamen began retreat towards Cross Creek (modern Fayetteville), NC.

7. Col. Buford and Gov. Rutledge moved north, up the Great Waxhaw Road on May 27th.

8. Lt. Col. Tarleton arrived in Camden on May 28th at 1 pm and departed at 2 am on May 29, 1780. Cornwallis arrives June 1st.


12. Lenud’s Ferry, site of Col. Anthony White’s patriot cavalry defeat on May 6, 1780.

Appendix 2

“The following is the letter of Dr. Robert Brownfield to the author (Judge James), giving a detailed account of the defeat of Buford's regiment....”

Dear Sir,

In obedience to your request, I send you a detailed account of the defeat and massacre of Col. (Abraham) Buford's regiment, near the borders of North Carolina, on the road leading from Camden to Salisbury. This regiment consisting of three hundred and fifty men, well appointed and equipped, had marched from Virginia for the relief of Charleston, and had advanced to Santee, where they were met by intelligence of the surrender; a retreat then became unavoidable.-- Between this place and Camden they fell in with Gen. (William) Caswell, at the head of about seven hundred North Carolina militia, whose object had been the same, and whose retreat became equally imperious. At Camden these two corps unfortunately separated; Caswell filed off to Pedee, and Buford pursued the road to Salisbury. This measure was accounted for by the want of correct intelligence of (Lt. Col. Banastre) Tarleton's prompt and rapid movements, who was in full pursuit with three hundred cavalry, and each a soldier of infantry behind him. -- Neglecting Caswell and his militia, the pursuit was continued after Buford to the Waxhaw. Finding he was approximating this corps, he despatched a flag, saying he was at Barclay's with seven hundred men, and summoned them to surrender on the terms granted to the garrison in Charleston. Buford immediately laid the summons before a council of his officers with three distinct propositions from himself: -- Shall we comply with Tarleton's summons? Shall we abandon the baggage, and, by a rapid movement, save ourselves? or, shall we fortify ourselves by the wagons, and wait his approach?

The first and second were decidedly rejected by the unanimous voice of the council, declaring it to be incompatible with their honour as soldiers, or the duty they owed their country, either to surrender or abandon the baggage on the bare statement of Tarleton. They had no certainty of the truth of his assertion, and that it might be only a ruse de guerre to alarm their fears and obtain a bloodless victory. The third was also negative on the ground, that although they might by this means defend themselves against Tarleton, but as no succour was near, and as Tarleton could, in a short time, obtain reinforcements from Cornwallis, against which no effectual resistance could be made, this measure would be unavailable.

The discussion soon resulted in a resolution to continue the march, maintaining the best possible order for the reception of the enemy. In a short time Tarleton's bugle was heard, and a furious attack was made on the rear guard, commanded by Liet. (Thomas) Pearson. Not a man escaped. Poor Pearson was inhumanely mangled on the face as he lay on his back. His nose and lip were bisected obliquely; several of his teeth were broken out in the upper jaw, and the under completely divided on each side. These wounds were inflicted after he had fallen, with several others on his head, shoulders, and arms. As a just tribute to the honour and Job-like patience of poor Pearson, it ought to be mentioned, that he lay for five weeks without uttering a single groan. His only nourishment was milk, drawn from a bottle through a quill. During that period he was totally deprived of speech, nor could he articulate distinctly after his wounds were healed.

This attack gave Buford the first confirmation of Tarleton's declaration by his flag. Unfortunately he was then compelled to prepare for action, on ground which presented no impediment to the full action of cavalry. Tarleton having arranged his infantry in the centre, and his cavalry on the wings, advanced to the charge with the horrid yells of infuriated demons. They were received with firmness, and completely checked, until the cavalry were gaining the rear. Buford now perceiving that further resistance was hopeless, ordered a flag to be hoisted and the arms to be grounded, expecting the usual treatment sanctioned by civilized warfare. This, however, made no part of Tarleton's creed. His ostensible pretext, for the relentless barbarity that ensued, was, that his horse was killed under him just as the flag was raised. He affected to believe that this was done afterwards, and imputed it to treachery on the part of Buford; but, in reality, a safe opportunity was presented to gratify that thirst for blood which marked his character in every conjuncture that promised probable impunity to himself. Ensign (John) Cruit, who advanced with the flag, was instantly cut down. Viewing this as an earnest of what they were to expect, a resumption of their arms was attempted, to sell their lives as dearly as possible; but before this was fully effected, Tarleton with his cruel myrmidons was in the midst of them, when commenced a scene of indiscriminate carnage never surpassed by the ruthless atrocities of the most barbarous savages.

The demand for quarters, seldom refused to a vanquished foe, was at once found to be in vain; -- not a man was spared -- and it was the concurrent testimony of all the survivors, that for fifteen minutes after every man was prostrate. They went over the ground plunging their bayonets into every one that exhibited any signs of life, and in some instances, where several had fallen one over the other, these monsters were seen to throw off on the point of the bayonet the uppermost, to come at those beneath. Capt. (John Champe) Carter,* who commanded the artillery and who led the van, continued his march without bringing his guns into action; this conduct excited suspicious suspicions unfavourable to the character of Carter, and these were strengthened by his being paroled on the ground, and his whole company without insult or injury being made prisoners of war. Whether he was called to account for his conduct, I have never learnt. These excepted, the only survivors of this tragic scene were Capts. Stokes, (Capt. Claiborne) Lawson and Hoard, Lieuts. Pearson and Jamison, and Ensign Cruit.

To consign to oblivion the memory of these gallant suffering few would be culpable injustice. When men have devoted their lives to the service of their country, and whose fate has been so singularly disastrous; there is an honest anxiety concerning them, springing from the best and warmest feelings of our nature, which certainly should be gratified. This is peculiarly the truth in regard to Capt. John Stokes, although in his military character perhaps not otherwise distinguished from his brother officers, than by the number of his wounds and the pre-eminence of sufferings. He received twenty-three wounds, and as he never for a moment lost his recollection, he often repeated to me the manner and order in which they were inflicted.

Early in the sanguinary conflict he was attacked by a dragon, who aimed many deadly blows at his head, all of which by the dextrous use of the small sword he easily parried; when another on the right, by one stroke, cut off his right hand through the metacarpal bones. He was then assailed by both, and instinctively attempted to defend his head with his left arm until the forefinger was cut off, and the arm hacked in eight or ten places from the wrist to the shoulder. His head was then laid open almost the whole length of the crown to the eye brows. After he fell he received several cuts on the face and shoulders. A soldier passing on in the work of death, asked if he expected quarters? Stokes answered I have not, nor do I mean to ask quarters, finish me as soon as possible; he then transfixed him twice with his bayonet. Another asked the same question and received the same answer, and he also thrust his bayonet twice through his body. Stokes had his eye fixed on a wounded British officer, sitting at some distance, when a serjeant came up, who addressed him with apparent humanity, and offered him protection from further injury at the risk of his life. All I ask, said Stokes, is to be laid by that officer that I may die in his presence. While performing this generous office the humane serjeant was twice obliged to lay him down, and stand over
him to defend him against the fury of his comrades. Doct. Stapleton, Tarleton's surgeon, whose name ought to be held up to eternal obloquy, was then dressing the wounds of the officer. Stokes, who lay bleeding at every pore, asked him to do something for his wounds, which he scornfully and inhumanely refused, until peremptorily ordered by the more humane officer, and even then only filled the wounds with rough tow, the particles of which could not be separated from the brain for several days.

Capt. (John) Stokes was a native of Pittsylvania County, Virginia. He was early intended for the bar, and having gone through the usual course of classical and other preparatory studies, he commenced the practice with the most flattering indications of future eminence. But the calm pursuits of peace not comporting with the ardour of his mind, he relinquished the fair prospect of professional emolument, and accepted a captaincy in Buford's regiment.

At this catastrophe, he was about twenty-seven years of age. His height was about the common standard; his figure and appearance, even in his mangled situation, inspired respect and veneration; and the fire of genius that sparkled in his dark piercing eye, gave indications of a mind fitted not only for the field, but for all the departments of civil life.

Shortly after the adoption of the constitution of the United States, he was promoted to the bench in the Federal Court -- married Miss Pearson -- and settled on the Yadkin River, where the county is called Stokes, after his name.

(Signed,)
R. Brownfield.

This letter, written in 1821, is excerpted from A Sketch of the Life of Brigadier General Francis Marion and a History of his Brigade From Its Rise in June 1780 until Disbanded in December 1782 by William Dobein James, (Charleston: Gould and Miles, 1821; reprinted, Marietta: Continental Book Company, 1948). The letter is found in the appendix.

Appendix 3

Excerpt From Banastre Tarleton’s Book on his Action at the Waxhaws.

On the 22d (of May, 1780), the army moved forwards upon the same road by which Colonel Buford had retreated ten days before: The infantry marched to Nelson's ferry with as much expedition as the climate would allow. From this place, Earl Cornwallis thought proper to detach a corps, consisting of forty of the 17th dragoons, and one hundred and thirty of the legion, with one hundred mounted infantry of the same regiment, and a three pounder, to pursue the Americans, who are now so much advanced, as to render any approach of the Continental infantry to that detachment impracticable. Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, on this occasion, was desired to consult his own judgment, as to the distance of the pursuit, or the mode of attack: To defeat Colonel Buford, and to take his cannon, would undoubtedly, in the present state of the Carolinas, have considerable effect; but the practicability of the design appeared so doubtful, and the distance of the enemy so great, that the attempt could only be guided by discretionary powers, and not by any antecedent commands. The detachment left the army on the 27th, and followed the Americans without any thing material happening on the route, except the loss of a number of horses, in consequence of the rapidity of the march, and the heat of the climate: By pressing horses on the road, the light troops arrived the next day at Camden, where Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton gained intelligence, that Colonel Buford had quitted Rugeley's mills on the 26th, and that he was marching with great diligence to join a corps then upon the road from Salisbury to Charlotte town in North Carolina.

This information strongly manifested that no time was to be lost, and that a vigorous effort was the only resource to prevent the junction of the two American corps. The two o'clock in the morning, the British troops being tolerably refreshed continued their pursuit: They reached Rugeley's by day light, where they learned that the continents were retreating above twenty miles in their front, towards the Catawba settlement, to meet their reinforcement. At this period, Tarleton might have contented himself with following them at his leisure to the boundary line of South Carolina, and from thence have returned upon his footsteps to join the main army, satisfied with pursuing the troops of Congress out of the province; but animated by the acalrity which he discovered both in the officers and men, to undergo all hardships, he put his detachment in motion, after adopting a stratagem to delay the march of the enemy: Captain (David) Kinlock, of the legion, was employed to carry a summons to the American commander, which, by magnifying the number of the British, might intimidate him into submission, or at least delay him whilst he deliberated on an answer. Colonel (Abraham) Buford, after detaining the flag for some time, without halting his march, returned a defiance. By this time many of the British cavalry and mounted infantry were totally worn out, and dropped successively into the rear; the horses of the three pounder were likewise unable to proceed. In this dilemma, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton found himself not far distant from the enemy, and, though not to the suitable condition for action, he determined as soon as possible to attack, there being no other expedient to stop their progress, and prevent their being reinforced the next morning: The only circumstance favorable to the British light troops at this hour, was the known inferiority of the continental cavalry, who could not harass their retreat to Earl Cornwallis's army, in case they were repulsed by the infantry.

At three o'clock in the afternoon, on the confines of South Carolina, the advanced guard of the British charged a serjeant and four men of the American light dragoons, and made them prisoners in the rear of their infantry. This event happening under the eyes of the two commanders, they respectively prepared their troops for action. Colonel Buford's force consisted of three hundred and eighty continental infantry of the Virginia line, a detachment of Washington's cavalry, and two six pounders: He chose his post in an open wood, to the right of the road; he formed his infantry in one line, with a small reserve; he placed his colours in the center, and he ordered his cannon, baggage, and waggons, to continue their march. Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton made his arrangement for the attack with all possible expedition: He confided his right wing, which was composed of sixty dragoons, and nearly as many mounted infantry, to Major (Charles) Cochrane, desiring him to dismount the latter, to gall the enemy's flank, before he moved against their front with his cavalry: Captains Corbet and Kinlock were directed, with the 17th dragoons and part of the legion, to charge the center of the Americans; whilst Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, with thirty chosen horse and some infantry, assaulted their right flank and reserve: This particular situation the commanding officer selected for himself, that he might discover the effect of the other attacks. The dragoons, the mounted infantry, and three pounder in the rear, as they could come up with their tired horses, were ordered to form something like a broken line, with a small reserve; he put his detachment in motion, after adopting a stratagem to delay the march of the enemy: Captain (David) Kinlock, of the legion, was employed to carry a summons to the American commander, which, by magnifying the number of the British, might intimidate him into submission, or at least delay him whilst he deliberated on an answer. Colonel (Abraham) Buford, after detaining the flag for some time, without halting his march, returned a defiance. By this time many of the British cavalry and mounted infantry were totally worn out, and dropped successively into the rear; the horses of the three pounder were likewise unable to proceed. In this dilemma, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton found himself not far distant from the enemy, and, though not to the suitable condition for action, he determined as soon as possible to attack, there being no other expedient to stop their progress, and prevent their being reinforced the next morning: The only circumstance favorable to the British light troops at this hour, was the known inferiority of the continental cavalry, who could not harass their retreat to Earl Cornwallis's army, in case they were repulsed by the infantry.
The American reinforcement had fallen back upon the report of the
convenience was provided by the British. This business being
Camden and Charlotte town to assist them, and every possible
not far distant from the field of battle: Surgeons were sent for from
and placed at the neighbouring plantations and in a meeting house,
soldiers who were unable to travel, were paroled the next morning,
dispatch, and treated with equal humanity. The American officers and
The wounded of both parties were collected with all possible
at a distance of three or four hundred paces.
expected from a successive fire of platoons or divisions, commenced
the assailants, in comparison with the execution that might be
infantry to retain their fire till the British dragoons were quite close;
Colonel Buford, also, committed a material error, in ordering the
might have decamped in the night, to join their reinforcement.
have supplied them with forage or provisions; and the continentals
pursuit, as the country in the neighborhood could not immediately
 troops, in both cases, would have been obliged to abandon the
by such a disposition he might have foiled the attempt: The British
cavalry, in all probability he either would not have been attacked, or
with the number of waggons, containing two royals, quantities of new
clothing, other military stores, and camp equipage, fell into the
possession of the victors.
The complete success of this attack may, in great measure, be
ascribed to the mistakes committed by the American commander: If
he had halted the waggons as soon as he found the British troops
pressing his rear, and formed them into a kind of redoubt, for the
protection of his cannon and infantry against the assault of the
cavalry, in all probability he either would not have been attacked, or
by such a disposition he might have foiled the attempt: The British
troops, in both cases, would have been obliged to abandon the
pursuit, as the country in the neighborhood could not immediately
have supplied them with forage or provisions; and the continentals
might have decamped in the night, to join their reinforcement.
Colonel Buford, also, committed a material error, in ordering the
infantry to retain their fire till the British dragoons were quite close;
which when given, had little effect either upon the minds or bodies of
the assailants, in comparison with the execution that might be
expected from a successive fire of platoons or divisions, commenced
at a distance of three or four hundred paces.
The wounded of both parties were collected with all possible
dispatch, and treated with equal humanity. The American officers and
soldiers who were unable to travel, were paroled the next morning,
and placed at the neighbouring plantations and in a meeting house,
not far distant from the field of battle: Surgeons were sent for from
Camden and Charlotte town to assist them, and every possible
convenience was provided by the British. This business being
accomplished, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton gained intelligence, that
the American reinforcement had fallen back upon the report of the

remount another horse, the one with which he led his dragoons being
overturned by the volley. Thus in a few minutes ended an affair
which might have had a very different termination. The British troops
had two officers killed, one wounded; three privates killed, thirteen
wounded; and thirty-one horses killed and wounded. The loss of
officers and men was great on the part of the Americans, owing to the
dragoons so effectually breaking the infantry, and to a report amongst
the cavalry, that they had lost their commanding officer, which
stimulated the soldiers to a vindictive asperity not easily restrained.
Upwards of one hundred officers and men were killed on the spot;
three colours, two six-pounders, and above two hundred prisoners,
with the number of waggons, containing two royals, quantities of new
clothing, other military stores, and camp equipage, fell into the
possession of the victors.


Appendix 4
Archaeological Report

In 1996, James Errante, an archaeologist, conducted a limited cultural
resource investigation of the Buford Monument site for the Lancaster
Historic Commission to authenticate the monument site, cairn and to
locate any other additional features. Posthole test of soil stratigraphy
and ¼ inch mesh screening for relics revealed no artifacts or cultural
features. The cairn of large bull quartz was carefully examined and a
40 cm. wide slot trench was excavated across the mass grave. This
trench revealed no soil color differences to indicate a mass grave
calcination. To measure any relative differences in soil compaction,
probe test were conducted across a section of the cairn with a one
inch steel rod at one-foot intervals. In the center of the cairn, this test
revealed a significant drop in soils compaction suggesting a pit like
feature. The report concluded that the marked mass grave is likely
authentic. It noted that the soil type does not encourage preservation
of human remains. Because of the refusal of an adjoining landowner
for access, reports of a second smaller mass grave of 25 soldiers
about 300 yards from the main grave was not validated. Several
slight ground depressions in the immediate vicinity were noted as
possible additional burial sites, but not necessarily contemporaneous
burials as the site was used for a Presbyterian church for some years
after 1780.

This 1941 highway historic marker is located in front of Buford’s Memorial Park on SC Highway 522 in Lancaster County, SC at “Buford’s Crossroads”. Interestingly, this marker was written and originally located on SC Highway 9 and was later relocated to the Monument site; thus the reference to 955 feet southwest. The designation of Col. Buford’s unit is subject to debate. Col. Buford had previously served as commander of the Virginia 14th Regiment, but his detachment of troops were to serve as replacements for the Virginia’s 3rd Detachment of Scott’s 2nd Virginia Brigade. Continental Line Regiments who were stationed in Charleston, SC. (O’Kelley, Vol. 2, p. 505)
Excerpt from USGS 7.5 minute topographic map, Antioch Quad. The area in yellow marks was extensively covered by a metal detector survey in the late 1980s and no artifacts were detected. The memorials and cairn are located approximately 7 miles east of Lancaster, SC.
Monuments at Buford Battle by Louise Pettus

On April 1, 1845 a group of citizens of Lancaster District led by Col. J. H. Witherspoon met at the Lancaster Court House and decided to start a subscription drive for a monument at Buford Battleground, nine miles east of the village of Lancasterville.

It was at the present-day junction of Highways 9 and 522 that Patriot Col. Abraham Buford, commander of a Virginia regiment of infantry and a company of artillery (300-400 men), was attacked by the British officer, Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton with about 700 cavalry and infantry.

The date was May 29, 1780. The massacre that followed was one of the most brutal and bloody in the Revolution War. The American loss was 113 killed, 150 wounded, and 53 taken prisoner. The British had 5 killed and 14 wounded.

The Lancaster citizens who met in the Lancaster Court, nearly 65 years after the event, never forgot the rallying cry, “Remember Tarleton’s Quarter.” Their resolution was filled with indignation and concern that the people of the District had never erected a monument to commemorate the event.

The committee, which consisted of J. H. Witherspoon, Col. Thomas W. Huey, Dr. R. E. Wylie, Samuel B. Massey, A. C. Dunlap, William Hilton, Samuel Robinson, and James R. Massey, sought to discover the history, both the military records and the traditional accounts of the local community.

Of all of the accounts of the butchery that occurred, none is more vivid than that of Capt. John Stokes (for whom Stokes County, N. C. is named). Stokes received 23 wounds, “he was attacked by two dragoons, one of whom cut off his right hand, which was extended to ward off the blow aimed at his head - the other cut off the forefinger of the left hand- he was then cut down by a blow on his head, after he fell, was transfixed four times with the bayonet; yet, strange to relate, he survived and was afterwards promoted to a seat on the Bench.”

Judge Stokes, it is said, did not need a gavel; instead, he used the silver ball attached to his arm as a replacement to his lost right hand.

The committee report, vividly written, was published in the “Camden Journal”, June 18, 1845. The only known American survivors of the attack were named as Captains Stokes, Lawson and Hoard, Lieutenants Pearson and Jamison, Ensign Cruit and Col. Buford himself. Some of the wounded had been taken to Waxhaw Church where they were nursed by local citizens, including young Andrew Jackson and his mother. It is known that a number were buried at Old Waxhaw cemetery but not who they were or where the graves were located.

At the battleground site the dead were buried in two mass graves. A man named Usher and the Rev. Jacob Carnes had assisted in burying the dead, and in 1845 Usher’s son recalled that 84 who died the day of the battle were buried in the larger grave and that 25 who died the following day were buried in the smaller grave about 300 yards off from the first grave. A two-foot wall of white rocks surrounds the common grave of the 84 patriots.

To raise the money to mark the two graves, the citizens of 1845 appointed a Monument Committee of 150 local citizens. It took 15 years to raise the money for a marble monument inscribed by W. T. White’s marble yard in Charleston.

Time and souvenir seekers who chipped off pieces of the marble so marred the 1860s monument that in the 1950s a second monument was erected. The Waxhaws Daughters of the American Revolution and the Lancaster County Historical Commission jointly erected in 1955 the second monument which preserved the wording of the first.

The land on which the battle occurred remained in private hands until 1894 when two acres around the monument were deeded to the Buford Monument Associate Reformed Presbyterian church. The church only survived four or five years and, in 1946, the A. R. P. Synod deeded the two acres to Lancaster County.

Pension Statement Testimony of Lt. Samuel Patton-NC Militia

Samuel Patton, son of farmer John Logan Patton of Ireland who emigrated with his family to America in 1755, was born in Rowan County, NC in about 1761. In 1778, Samuel enlisted in the North Carolina Militia to serve in various campaigns throughout North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia as both an infantryman and waggoner.

“We marched a few days, headin' home after the British had attacked us at Monck's Corner and captured all our supplies. There was a small bunch of us men, a small group of cavalry with just a few horse. My horse was captured at Monck's Creek - the second horse I lost during the war.

"After a few days we run into a group of soldiers that was come up from Charleston which we learned had just fell to the British a few days before. This bunch was led by Colonel Abraham Buford and was about 350 strong with a couple of cannon.

"Colonel Buford told us that we was to join his militia group and that we was to march back to North Carolina to defend our state from the British advancin' behind us. He told us that they had learned that the British general Cornwallis was close on our tail, with the intent to capture or kill us all. So of course, we was all eager to get home and away from that terrible possibility.

"We had marched a road just parallel the Santee River and then later along the Wateree which will lead us to North Carolina. I was drivin' a wagon, being one of the most experienced drivers, that was left from the battle at Monck's Creek which was loaded with supplies.

"Just a couple of days after we met up with Colonel Buford a redcoat caught up to our rear and told us that Cornwallis was upon our rear with just a few hours to catch up to us and that we was to surrender our face a battalion of some one thousand men. Colonel Buford called all us officers together to discuss the matter, and figurin' Cornwallis to be lyin' about the size of his band, ordered the wagons to continue on the march. I was placed in charge of a group of men and instructed to ride with the wind for home! 'Course I was happy about these orders!

"Well we rode on fast as we could and in the distance we could hear the musket fire and terrible booms of cannon. We didn't learn until the next day what had happened - the British attacked our men full force and after our lines had fired they rushed and massacred our men even after they had raised a white flag of surrender. There again the British was massacin' our men with no care for their lives or their own honor."
Photograph showing 1860 memorial obelisk and cairn.
Appendix 8

Order of Battle

American Patriot Forces

Commanding Officer    Colonel Abraham Buford

Continents 350
3rd Virginia Detachment of Scott’s Virginia Brigade
   Major Thomas Ridley
   Captain Andrew Wallace
   Captain Claiborne W. Lawson
   Captain Robert Woodson
   Captain John Stokes*
   Captain Adam Wallace
   Captain-Lieutenant Thomas Catlett
Unknown Sergeant
   3rd Regiment of Continental Light Dragoons

South Carolina Militia 180

Casualties 113 killed, 203 captured

British Forces

Commanding Officer    Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton

British Regulars
   Captain William Henry Talbot
   17th Regiment of Light Dragoons 40
      Lieutenant Matthew Patteshall

Provincials
   Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton
   British Legion
      Major Charles Cochrane
      Legion Infantry 100
         Lieutenant Lochlan McDonald
         Lieutenant Peter Campbell
      Legion Cavalry 130
         Captain David Kinlock
         Captain Charles Campbell

Casualties 16 killed, 12 wounded


- Capt. John Stokes of Guilford County, NC was mutilated in this battle with 12 wounds; in addition to other wounds, he lost one of his hands. He was a brother of North Carolina Gov. Montfort Stokes and Judge of the U. S. District Court in North Carolina.
- Capt. John Champe Carter commanded the Patriot two-piece artillery company, while not in the action, was captured thereafter.
Sketch of initial troop positions at the Battle of the Waxhaws by Maj. Thomas A. Rider, II
The South Carolina Historical Society - Revolutionary War Collections  Mike Coker

The South Carolina Historical Society in Charleston hosts a wealth of primary source material and published resources relating to the American Revolution. One of the Society’s most outstanding manuscript collections is the papers of Henry Laurens, a South Carolina merchant and planter who served as President of the U.S. Continental Congress and as a diplomat. Laurens’ correspondents included George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Lafayette, and many other notables of the time. His letters, and other original documents, were published in a series. The Society also holds the papers of his son, John Laurens, an officer on Washington’s staff, and the papers of another South Carolinian, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, a soldier, statesman, and diplomat. Among Pinckney’s correspondents were Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and John Jay. The papers of Arthur Middleton (1742-1787), a member of the Continental Congress, consist mainly of correspondence and memoranda concerning public and military affairs in Charleston and Philadelphia, and such issues as the national debt and army and naval defenses.

You will also find letters, memoirs, and other documents from the Revolutionary era at SCHS in the papers of the prominent South Carolina families of Ball, Cochran, Vanderhorst, Manigault, and others. In addition, there is a substantial number of smaller collections and individual documents from this period, including letters (177-1781) of the Marquis de Lafayette, correspondence of General William Moultrie, and a letter (1781) from Mary Heriot to her husband Robert, a prisoner of the British, in which she writes of a narrow escape which she and her children experienced in Georgetown, S.C., when a retreating British galley fired on their house.

In the Society’s holdings there is a considerable amount of original military records including order books of generals Moultrie and Lincoln, an order book of the 4th S.C. Regiment, returns and payroll records of the 2nd S.C. Regiment (the unit commanded by Francis Marion, the “Swamp Fox”), records of the Southern Department of the Continental Army, and a few British documents. The Harleston Family Papers include military records of Major Isaac Harleston (1745-1798).

The visual materials collection at SCHS contains images of many important figures of the Revolution, artwork depicting battles and other scenes of the time, as well as maps and charts. In the library, a large collection of books, pamphlets, and articles cover the American Revolution in nearly every aspect.

In 2000, the SCHS spearheaded a project to create THE REVOLUTION, a CD for personal computers about the American Revolution in S.C. THE REVOLUTION is the 21st -century equivalent of a 20th-century coffee table book, but greatly expanded. The pictures, text, and stories common in coffee table books are enriched in the CD-ROM medium with interactive timelines, slide presentations, video commentaries by noted scholars, and outstanding computer-generated maps of colonial and revolutionary sites. Through the CD-ROM, South Carolina Heritage Visitors will have a unique product that will recall the rich history and heritage of the state during the late Colonial and Revolutionary War periods. Copies of this CD are still available for purchase through their website.

Check out the Revolutionary War manuscripts and other related holdings of SCHS at their website at www.schistory.org. The online catalog features descriptions of the collections mentioned above and many more. (Hint: search in the “Browse” mode under the subject United States—History—Revolution, or South Carolina—History—Revolution). The research library is open to the public (for a nominal fee to non-members). The Society is located in the beautiful Robert Mills designed “Fireproof Building”, Meeting Street at Chalmers Street, Charleston, South Carolina. The SCHS is open Monday through Fridays from 9 am until 4 pm, on Saturdays at 9 am until 2 pm and on Thursday evenings until 7:30 pm.

Mike Coker, curator of the Visual Materials Archives (VMA) and Webmaster for the South Carolina Historical Society for the past four years, primary interest has always been the Civil War. He acquired a new appreciation for the American Revolution (especially in the South) after attending the Francis Marion the Battle of Camden Symposia. He offers to lend a hand with any of the readers with their research, and can be reached at mike.coker@schistory.org.

Patrick O’ Kelley’s New Book – ”Nothing but Blood and Slaughter” The Revolutionary War in the Carolinas, Volume Two, 1780

In Nothing but Blood and Slaughter, Volume One, the British had gained a foothold in the South, and had begun their move to retake the Carolinas. Their objective was to capture the largest port and richest port south of New York City and destroy the Southern Continental army.

In "Nothing but Blood and Slaughter" The Revolutionary War in the Carolinas, Volume Two, 1780 the fight for Charleston becomes the longest siege in the American Revolution. When the beleaguered forces surrender, it becomes the worst defeat in of the United States Army until the fall of the Philippines in 1942. The British quickly capture South Carolina, and the end of the war looks very near. The British begin plans that will divide up the country when the war will be finally over and under British rule again.

What the British did not anticipate is how to win the peace. This book chronicles the start of that guerrilla movement with the Presbyterian uprising. Scot-Irish backwoodsmen take on the British army in partisan warfare, striking at less defended targets. This will lead to full-scale partisan warfare that would drag every bit of British manpower and equipment in the South into the fight. A second Continental army is defeated at Camden, and the British appear unstoppable, except for the never-ending guerilla warfare along their supply lines and logistical bases. By the end of 1780 the British attempt to occupy North Carolina, which will end in disasters at King’s Mountain and Blackstock’s.

This book is the second volume of four that attempts to list every military action, no matter how small, in the Carolinas. Critics have called the series “the most complete history of the war in the Carolinas “and” a “MUST HAVE for any military history library of the American War of Independence.”

The author, Patrick J. O’Kelley is retired from the US Army Special Forces. He is currently a Junior ROTC instructor and has been a Revolutionary War living historian for over 25 years.

"Nothing but Blood and Slaughter" The Revolutionary War in the Carolinas, Volume Two, 1780 is available from the publisher’s

Banastre Tarleton is the subject of so much propaganda that he is remembered largely for the myth and the atrocities, alleged and real. There is much more to the man than that, and the best place to find a glimpse of this entertaining personality is in his only biography, Robert D. Bass' The Green Dragoon.

Dr. Bass was Professor of History, English and Government at Annapolis. His other Revolutionary War histories include books on Thomas Sumter, Francis Marion and the Carolina backcountry war around Ninety-Six. After completing the manuscript for Green Dragoon in 1956, he "turned up" Sir Banastre's personal papers, untouched since the General's death in 1833. So Bass started over, completing a book that would eventually reach 454 pages of text in exhausting detail. It became a joint history of Tarleton and of his mistress of 15 years, the actress/poet/novelist Mary Robinson. If Tarleton ever had a competitor for colorful behavior, it was Mary. It is not an easy read. It bogs down in the wartime letters and dispatches, many of which revolve around Tarleton's family refusing to pay his gambling debts. This slows down the war narrative, but it is certainly thorough.

There are many colorful parts, and I always want to jump ahead to them. This is a mistake. Although it is often laborious reading, Green Dragoon is a worthy history of the Revolution in the South and a surprisingly entertaining account of Regency England. Green Dragoon begins with a breathless description of Tarleton breaking a wild black stallion. This episode presumably happened in North Carolina as witnessed by a Loyalist remembering the event from his youth. It was taken from an 1861 biography of Andrew Jackson and is perhaps the only fragment of the book I doubt. Written in adulation, Tarleton comes across as a British Fabio complete with fire breathing steed, "immense spurs", and enough chutzpah for the whole British Army. It is also the only account I can find that describes Tarleton as "short." All first hand accounts describe him as "middle-sized," making this an excellent example of how a historically dubious story can influence the way historical characters are visualized from then on. Factual or not, the piece is a lot of fun, and if nothing else paints a portrait of a rake-hell young man, who proved by his actions later in Europe to be a " rake-hell" indeed. This first swashbuckling chapter introduces the reader to the main subject through the campaign and surrender at Yorktown.

From there Bass takes us back into Banastre's childhood and youth. He alternates chapters of Tarleton's progress through the Revolutionary War with that of Mary Robinson who was "born into a life of tempest and tears".

And so the chapters are intertwined until at last Ban and Mary are intertwined literally - in a 15-year romance that sees them cavort about London, Paris, and Germany. Gambling, fighting, breaking up - until she published such passionate poetry intended for him that he could not help but come back to her. Why hasn't there been a movie made about these two? Read Green Dragoon and you'll find that Butcher Tarleton was also many, many other personalities. For one, he was a true jock: a noted athlete at Oxford, a tireless horseman during the war, and a popular cricket player. He continuously beat the Princes Royal at tennis. He made preposterous bets on accomplishing physical deeds. For example, he bet that he could run 100 yards with another person on his back faster than someone else could trot their favorite horse twice the distance. He raced his own small stable of horses and became a professional gambler for a time, owning his own bank. His once-enemy-turned-friend, the Duc de Lauzun, shared Mary Robinson with him briefly. The Duc and Tarleton were both present at a dinner for 12 in Paris the moment that Princess Lamballe's head was carried beneath their windows. Within a year, Tarleton was the only one of the 12 left alive. He and Mary escaped France exactly one day before the revolutionary authorities issued an edict to arrest all Englishmen in France. There is speculation that he could be the prototype for the fictitious "Scarlet Pimpernel."

There's even more speculation that he spied for the British Government, a fact that is now under investigation by several historians. He later befriended wartime opponents Lafay ette and Kosciusko. Tarleton arranged for the Polish hero to be presented with a ceremonial sword during a trip to England. The 'Butcher of the Carolinas' was pretty soft sometimes.

After Mary Robinson lost the use of her legs following her tragic miscarriage, Tarleton would carry her to and from her box at the theater in his arms. It was the talk of London. And anyone who can read the delightful letter he wrote his sister Bridget and not take a shine to the boy has absolutely no heart. Especially since this was written immediately after he lost the 2 fingers at Guilford Courthouse.

Probably the most unattractive aspect of Tarleton's life was not his military conduct in America, but his staunch opposition to the Abolition Movement in Parliament. Representing Liverpool and its reliance on the Slave Trade, he didn't have much practical choice. Yet our own 21st century sensibilities are disappointed.

So many little nuggets of characterization are sprinkled throughout Green Dragoon, it is often difficult, but certainly possible, to find vital, breathing people beneath the barrage of facts. In fact, Mrs. Robinson's tumultuous life and later fame as a writer are every bit as engrossing as Tarleton's bad boy antics. She was a friend to William Taylor Coleridge and Mary Wollstonecraft. She and artist Marie Cosway wrote a book together.

When one remembers Cosway as Thomas Jefferson's mistress during his Parisian era, one wonders if the future President and his ex-enemy ever met at a social event, each accompanying a beautiful and artistic mistress. Mary wrote a feminist tract titled Thoughts on the Condition of Women and on the Injustice of Mental Subordination and has become something of a feminist icon. Yet she was also a friend of Marie Antoinette, bringing revealing Paris fashions back to a scandalized London. Had there been Prozac in the 18th century, Ban and Mary might have continued their affair until the end of her fragile life. However, at last they parted. Tarleton went on to better things. Those who already despise him will hate him even more to know that he straightened out his gambling addiction, married a pretty heiress 22 years his junior, became a General and a Knight of the Bath, lived as a country squire in one of Herefordshire's most luscious villages, and died in his own bed of old age at 78.

Tarleton and Mary Robinson were certainly not perfect, but it is often their flaws that make them so interesting. Reading Green Dragoon, one realizes that as well as being, to some, a fiend, Tarleton was also a rascal easily manipulated by the opposite sex. Mary was a member of the demimonde, but she was also smart as a whip. In all, they were a pair made in romance novel heaven. As the dust jacket for Green Dragoon so aptly states, a duo that could well have inspired the great satirical novel Vanity Fair.

Holley Calmes, a true fan of Banastre Tarleton, is a public relations and marketing professional specializing in the arts and art history. She writes for newspapers and periodicals from her homes in Hiawassee and Duluth, Georgia. She may be reached at hcalmes@mindspring.com

David P. Reuwer

Saturated with ideas from popular culture and television, many of us are uninformed or misinformed about the actual engagements of the American Revolution in the Southern Campaigns. Anthony J. Scotti, Jr. attacks the myth and reality of Banastre Tarleton with as much vigor as the Green Dragoon frequently charged his legion. Scotti informs us that Tarleton is both myth and reality in 300 pages of Brutal Virtue, 2002 published by Heritage Books, Inc., Bowie, Maryland. In chapters entitled “Virtue, Discipline, Terror”; the author explores the facts within the legends such that Tarleton the historic man emerges from the fog of war. Scotti’s extensive research and Revolutionary military understanding present facts that give a valid portrayal of a real personality.

Distinctive slants and biases on the part of previous writers of history do turn Tarleton into varied meanings of “bloody Ban, the Butcher, an evil beast” (from post Revolutionary historians). A good example is the Gen. Richard Richardson grave exhumation supposedly performed by Tarleton. He and his dragoons terrorized and plundered the Richardson plantation on the Santee in November 1780. Tarleton reportedly had the deceased Richardson’s body dug up but this was first related by his grandson, Gov. John Peter Richardson, II, who was not born until 21 years afterwards. His father, Gen. John Burchell Richardson, was there at age 10 when the Legionaires looted the home but he never left any written account. Maj. Richard Richardson, Francis Marion and William D. James all visited the house shortly thereafter but none mentioned that the British officer disinterred the six-week-old corpse. Scotti’s homework goes farther: “A father and his small son sitting in front of a fireplace on a cold, wintry night as the farmer relates the evil doings of a certain Lt. Col. Tarleton. It is possible that both father and son got the idea for the ghoulish deed from a statement made by Gov. John Rutledge right after Tarleton’s raid. Rutledge asserted that the young Briton ‘exceeded his usual Barbarity…. & this because he pretended to believe, that the poor old Genl. Was with the Rebel-Army, tho’ had he open’d his grave, before the Door, he might have seen the Contrary.’”

What is also to Scotti’s credit beyond his astute presentation of facts is that he argues suspect categories and queries mythology. His analysis of the Waxhaws is erudite. That the historic Tarleton behaves with as much vigor as the Green Dragoon frequently charged his legion. The terror was never sufficient for his purposes.” The terror was never sufficient for his purposes.”

British perceptions of Tarleton were different than those of the liberty-loving rebel patriots. Scotti reports: “Aside from the Cowpens, the young Englishman was the usual winner of impressive victories. Consequently, he became a hero to his troops and the public back home. The Annual Register called him “a striking specimen of that active gallantry, and of those peculiar military talents, which have since so highly distinguished his character.”

We read through objective career information, Legion formation and organization, and detailed, documented incidents of his military action. Whatever else his contemporaries saw in Ban, Scotti enables us to see that they saw him. He was a real man of war, not just a myth.

Scotti’s perspective of what our revolutionary patriots attempted is succinctly layed out in my favorite pages 130 through 133. The nuggets in his words are: “Although eager for victory, they had to stay patient and conduct a defensive war. As a virtuous people, they needed to prove the legitimacy, honor, and respectability of their cause in order to avoid the stigma of being simple rebels. They had to maintain the ethos of the good, Christian soldier and follow through with virtue in word and deed. They needed to be self-restrained and to avoid any type of brutality and wanton revenge. Keeping the appearance of ‘injured innocence’ and moral superiority through discipline was paramount to George Washington and the other revolutionary leaders. By conducting a just war, the enemy could be made to appear evil.”

Then, the author adroitly places the brutal virtue employed by Tarleton in the physical, psychological and political context of the Revolution. “Tarleton was one of the most visible threats to the American moral cause. The British Legion commandant was enterprising, active, unrelenting, and usually victorious. His achievements at Monck’s Corner, Lenud’s Ferry, the Waxhaws, and Fishing Creek had profound implications. By defeating the Rebels in battle, he called into question their virtue, the absolute basis of their cause. By its very nature, virtue implies that something is good and righteous. However, American defeats at the hands of the British Legion inferred that the revolutionaries were doing something wrong and that their moral superiority was flawed. Revenge is always a big temptation and Tarleton represented a serious threat to American efforts to restrain themselves. Unfortunately for the revolutionaries, they failed the test. The American goal from the start was to limit their violent impulses in order to appear as a civilized and virtuous people. However, Tarleton’s Legion only incited the Rebels to respond with brutality.” Underneath the battles which won a new nation, ran hatred and contempt whose expressions were often shocking. Tarleton was at the epicenter of those brutal expressions.

Anthony J. Scotti, Jr., Ph.D. from the University of South Carolina in History. Tony is an editor at BCL-Manly, Inc. publishers and author of Brutal Virtue, The Myth and Reality of Banastre Tarleton, (Bowie, MD: Heritage Books, 2002) tonyjscott1780@yahoo.com

Tom Rider has shared his masters thesis on the Waxhaws: MASSACRE OR MYTH: NO QUARTER AT THE WAXHAWS, 29 MAY 1780. This thesis is indispensable reference for anyone wanting a complete library of published research on the Battle of the Waxhaws. I have given a copy USC’s The Caroliniana Library in Columbia, SC and the Lancaster County, SC public library for anyone wanting a copy.

Rider’s thesis posits the question, “were instances of no quarter at the Waxhaws simply examples of battlefield misconduct, or do other factors explain the viciousness of the fighting during this engagement?” Rider explores three general characterizations of most modern literature on the Battle of the Waxhaws: first, the depiction of Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton and his soldiers as unusually brutal; second, the little analysis on the tactics and events on the battlefield; finally, many modern writers interest in the propaganda aspects of the battle rather than the military results of Buford’s defeat.

Rider carefully examines the troops disposition before the battle, Tarleton’s cavalry tactics and Buford’s commands and the probable sequence of events after the first cavalry charge. His careful research and detailed references supports his conclusions that the dynamics of the battlefield, the use of cavalry shock tactics and close combat that followed contributed to the extensive Patriot casualties before the British officers gained control over the battlefield.
Please submit items to post upcoming Southern Campaign programs and events that may be of interest to Revolutionary War researchers and history buffs.

October 7, 2004 Savannah, Ga. - Dr. Charles Elmore of Savannah State University lectures on the Haitian participation in the Revolutionary War Battle of Savannah; Savannah History Museum Theater, 6:30 p.m. refreshments, 7:00 p.m. lecture. http://www.chsgeorgia.org

October 7, 2004 Kings Mountain National Military Park, SC – 224th Anniversary wreath laying at the US Monument at 11am, keynote address at 3 pm. http://www.nps.gov/kimo

October 9, 2004 Ninety Six National Historic Site - Annual Candlelight Tour 7 pm to 9 pm. Saturday afternoon program beforehand. www.nps.gov/nisi (864) 543-4068


November 13, 2004 Church of the Epiphany, Eutawville, SC - bus tour by David P. Reuwer and Charles B. Baxley will cover low country sites of the Battles at Biggin Church and Bridge, Fairlawn Plantation and fort (extant earthworks), United States President